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In this paper I focus in on the manner in which Percy’s fiction dramatizes 
the aesthetic reversal of alienation. Namely, I illuminate Heidegger’s influence 
on Percy’s work by tracking Percy’s marginalia in his copy of Existence and Being, 
an early English translation of several of Heidegger’s essays edited by Werner 
Brock. This entails attending to what Lewis Lawson called the “indirect 
communications” between Percy’s philosophical essays and fiction. I draw upon 
Percy’s arguments in a number of essays, particularly “Symbol as Hermeneutic 
in Existentialism” to demonstrate the extent of Heidegger’s influence on Percy 
early in his career. With this framework established, I then offer readings of both 
Will Barrett novels, The Last Gentleman and The Second Coming, attending 
especially to Percy’s repeated allusions to radar, electro-magnetic fields, and 
noxious particles, to illustrate the manner in which Percy’s representation of Will 
Barrett’s existential experience is informed by Heidegger’s concepts of Dasein 
and Stimmung. This reading attends in particular to the struggles of characters 
who are out of tune with the immanent world and who seek out alternative 
communities founded on a shared sense of isolation. 
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Building on Sarah Ahmed’s theorization that alienation arises when 
“affect aliens” sense that objects which excite or gladden others fail to make 
similar impressions on them, I unveil the ways Percy’s fiction participates in a 
project of “naming the despair” that presents the conditions of modern alienation 
to the reader while undercutting it through the establishment of intersubjectivity. 
In this respect, I build on the work of Jonathan Flatley in Affective Mapping: 
Melancholia and the Politics of Modernism. I achieve this by zeroing in on the 
somatic reifications of Will Barrett’s existential plight, a move which allows a 
discussion of the ways Percy participates in contemporary debates over the Mind 
Body Divide and seeks to synthesize Heidegger’s metaphysics with cognitive 
science and semiotics. By incorporating a discussion of Will’s physical ailments, I 
explore the ways in which Percy makes his protagonist’s predicament felt and 
the ways in which readers and characters are invited into a community seeking 
out the root causes of the modern malaise. 
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Artisanal Toast. It’s the latest form of conspicuous consumption available 
in eateries and coffee shops across the San Francisco Bay Area. An August 2013 
op-ed in Venture Beat hurled responsibility for the trend at the feet of San 
Francisco’s tech workers, blaming them for the proliferation of $4 toast shops. 
But when John Gravois started his investigation into the wave of cinnamon raisin 
slabs sweeping the city, he did so with an eye towards discovering the origins of 
the trend. At some point, someone had decided to slice hearty pieces of 
homemade bread, toast them, slather them in butter and cinnamon sugar, and 
pass them across the counter. Though most of the media outcry—that’s not an 
exaggeration, there was an outcry—blamed a small shop called The Mill, when 
Gravois asked, the owner of that shop pointed the finger further up the trail, to a 
little place in Outer Sunset called the Trouble Coffee and Coconut Club. And for 
some reason, Gravois decided he had to find this place. His initial cynicism about 
the irritatingly trendy toast, the latest form of the “artisanal/fair trade/organic-
only” snobbery practiced by his city’s quasi-elite gave way to a curiosity about 
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the origins of the trend. So he traced the toast back to its founder: Giulietta 
Carrelli. 
Had Gravois not found Giulietta, his story likely would have arrived at 
the same place the Venture Beat story did. If he had written it at all, it would have 
appeared in the form of a predictable lament for San Francisco past, a world 
where explorers and settlers rend the necessities of life from the earth and a few 
wealthy elites spend their money not on 5 dollar coffees and two hundred dollar 
yoga pants, but on the good things of life, things like Opera and theatre and 
libraries. Giulietta’s story isn’t a desperate, earnest paean for handmade things 
like the tales that grace the pages of Garden & Gun. It’s a story of survival. Since 
she was in high school, Gravois explains, Carrelli has suffered from a type of 
schizophrenia which manifests itself through depressed and manic moods 
accompanied by delusions and hallucinations (“Schizoaffective Disorder”). She’s 
susceptible to bouts of depression or mania and psychotic episodes, including 
paranoid delusions. When her troubles started she thought someone was 
slipping her hallucinogens, possibly acid or mushroom tea. But as her bouts 
continued, she began to realize that something else was going on. She didn’t 
have the name for it, “schizoaffective disorder,” until recently, but it cost her 
relationships, prevented her from holding a job or an apartment, and left her 
wandering the country. At some points, she would find herself in a new 
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environment, isolated, unable to communicate her alienation to anyone around 
her. The coffee shop, Gravois writes, is an “ingenious mechanism—a specialized 
tool—designed to keep Carrelli tethered to herself” (Gravois). The toast is just 
comfort food, something simple to make that she put on the menu and tried to 
make well when she first opened Trouble. 
Carrelli’s story of survival is permeated by encounters with fellow 
searchers: a holocaust survivor, a sympathetic coffee shop manager, Gravois 
himself. It is a story about finding a mode of reentering the world and reentering 
community. If the effects of schizoaffective disorder left her alienated, alone, and 
unable to communicate, these relationships helped her develop coping 
mechanisms, escape self-destructive patterns of self-medication, forge routines.  
Carrelli has covered her torso in tattoos, she wears the same distinctive clothes 
on a daily basis, and she rides to work on the same paths every day. Now when 
she gets disoriented or forgets why she’s on a street, the community members 
around her recognize her. They can point her in the right direction, help her 
remember who she is and cope with the “troubles” she faces.  “I’m trying to stay 
connected to the self,” Carrelli says, “I’m wearing the same outfit every day…I 
take the same routes every day. I own Trouble Coffee so that people recognize 
my face—so they can help me. ”Like many people that contend with 
psychological disorders, Carelli depends on the strong and weak ties she’s 
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amassed in her community to structure her life. In that respect, she isn’t alone. 
Our lives are structured by patterns of weak and strong ties, by communities 
within communities. This is what putting down roots means.  
The communities that structure our lives often operate beneath our radar, 
but for those who struggle to remain connected to the self, communal ties must 
be defined, reinforced, and consciously relied upon daily. For Carelli, the 
importance of these ties is more apparent because the consequences of neglecting 
her communal ties, of falling away from this web of relationships, are dire. When 
I first heard Carrelli’s story, the first thing that struck me was the unique way she 
talked about her experience. Repeatedly she describes her routines and her coffee 
shops as mechanisms for staying “tethered” or “connected” to the self. I’m not 
accustomed to hearing people speak about their lives as struggles to re-connect 
with the self, at least not in radio interviews with This American Life. You just 
rarely hear it outside of philosophical novels and theory books. Yet listening to 
Giulietta speak, it’s apparent that she conceives of her “troubles” as problems 
rooted simultaneously in her physiology and her existential experience. The two 
are part and parcel of the same thing. Though she never quotes Sartre or 
Kierkegaard, her responses in the article to questions about her experience seem 
so keenly calibrated to her existential experience that it is hard to ascertain ways 
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in which she differentiates between the physiological elements of her condition 
and her methods of representing her subjective experience. 
Giulietta Carrelli’s story struck me in large part because I had spent the 
last year thinking about the types of problems she describes. My mode of inquiry 
was very different from hers. I was just reading novels. They weren’t novels 
about people with schizoaffective disorder per say, though plenty of the 
characters manifest behavior straight out of the DSM. Rather, I spent much of the 
last year reading stories about people who are prone to fall out of tune with the 
rest of the world. In the novels of Walker Percy, the protagonists and the women 
they love are just these types of people. The hero of The Last Gentleman and The 
Second Coming, Will Barrett, occasionally slips into amnesia, he experiences fugue 
states, he becomes disoriented and develops ideas of reference. In some cases, he 
manifests what can only be described as abject paranoia about the approach of 
“noxious particles,” the advent of the apocalypse, and a mass exodus of the Jews 
from America. Though at times he plays the role of successful Wall Street 
Lawyer, devoted friend, father, philanthropist, or white collar criminal, he is 
always out of sorts with the world around him. His ties to his community and 
the physical, immanent world, are weak and limited. He is, in a sense, dead to 
that world. His task, like Percy’s other protagonists, is to find a way of reentering 
the world of the living. Like Giulietta, Will’s mechanism for reentering life is 
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largely dependent on tuning into the community around him. Though he too is 
sick, his journey throughout The Last Gentleman and The Second Coming is 
towards a more authentic mode of being, a way of living in the world that 
enables him to stay connected to the self. 
Plenty of ink has been spilled in attempts to articulate Percy’s vision of the 
self and the self’s relationship to the immanent world and the realm of the 
transcendent. This type of criticism typically falls into one or two of three camps: 
the Catholic Theological Tradition, the Southern novel, or the Existential novel. 
Early criticism of Percy’s work was especially prone to this type of analysis, 
which is reminiscent of T.S. Eliot’s vision of the canon in “Tradition and the 
Individual Talent.” In Eliot’s view, the canon is an eternal collection of 
monuments that continues to grow as civilization moves forward in time. New 
works of genius draw on, and are judged against, the standard of the canon, but 
they also change the nature of the canon as they are incorporated into it (406). 
This is the model which has governed Percy criticism for years. A critic makes an 
argument rooted in one of the three canons. Percy is prophet rearticulating 
Catholic Doctrine. Percy writes about Quentin Compsons who do not commit 
suicide. Percy is a Southern practitioner of the European existential novel. After 
selecting which intellectual tradition(s) to place Percy’s work in, they analyze his 
relationship to other monuments in that canon and establish his place in it.  
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This mode of criticism has been incredibly productive, and has helped 
produce insightful readings of many of Percy’s works.  Just like the positivist 
scientism Percy took issue with, this type of categorization is best accompanied 
by a thorough confrontation with the uniqueness of particular cases and 
relationships. Reading through Heidegger’s conceptualizations of Stimmung and 
Dasein can help us read for the ways the book dramatizes intersubjective 
relationships and establishes communities with the power to name and pursue 
the roots of the despair. It is a slight shift of focus, but it helps bring variants of 
the positivist epistemology Percy criticized into focus alongside the alternatives 
he offers. In this paper I strive to demonstrate the ways in which a better 
engagement with the Heideggerian dimensions of Percy’s fiction can enrich our 
understanding of the traditions which Percy’s fiction participates in.  My method 
is informed by readings of Percy’s philosophical writings collected in The 
Message in the Bottle and the marginalia in his copy of Martin Heidegger’s 
Existence and Being. Reckoning with Heidegger’s influence on Percy’s thought 
forces readers to grapple with the type of art that emerges out of an 
anthropology rooted in immanence. Consequently, my readings in the latter 
chapters center around Will Barrett’s experience of his immanent world, 
particularly the ways he perceives himself as a radar receiver and a target for 
noxious particles. In doing so I demonstrate the extent to which Heidegger’s 
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concepts of Dasein and Stimmung form a framework for Percy’s conception of the 
self and its relationship to the immanent world.  It could be argued that this is 
yet another tradition of thought, but I show in this paper that starting from the 
anthropology that undergirds Percy’s character development—a vision of Dasein 
as “being with” the world in varying degrees of authenticity depending on the 
Stimmung or attunement of Dasein —enables a more fruitful engagement with 
Percy’s representation of the relationship between alienation and modernity and 
reveals the mitigating effects intersubjectivity has on the subjective experience of 
the malaise. Most importantly, this paper lays the groundwork for a later project, 
in which I intend to elucidate more clearly the formal characteristics of Percy’s 
aesthetic which help to represent, or name, the subjective experience of 
immanence and the ways in which they demonstrate a particularly Heideggerian 
mode of thinking about Being-in-the-world.
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Chapter 1: Reading Heidegger with Percy or How I Discovered the 
Heideggerian Dimensions of Percy’s Work One Spring Day in South Carolina in 
2013 While Thinking About the Great Exhibition of 18-- 
Why does man feel so bad in the very age when, more than in any other age he has 
succeeded in satisfying his needs and making over the world for his own use? 
-Walker Percy “The Delta Factor” 
 It was while preparing for a seminar on the Victorian novel and New 
Formalism that I found myself slogging through Heidegger for the first time. 
Sitting on my neighbor’s roof with a copy of Craft in Theory open to Heidegger’s 
essay “The Thing,” I read the words that ignited my interest in his influence on 
Percy. In the essay Heidegger writes 
Man stares at what the explosion of the atom bomb could bring with it. He 
does not see that the atom bomb and its explosion are the mere final 
emission of what has long since taken place, has already happened. Not to 
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mention the single hydrogen bomb, whose triggering, thought through to 
its utmost potential, might be enough to snuff out all life on earth. What is 
this helpless anxiety still waiting for, if the terrible has already happened? 
(405) 
As my eyes scanned the page, I heard the echo of another passage: Percy’s post-
apocalyptic rendering of a playground in Gentilly in the final chapter of The 
Moviegoer. I decided to ignore the rest of my reading for the seminar that would 
begin in 45 minutes, pulled my copy of The Moviegoer from the shelf, and 
returned to the roof to re-read the novel’s climax. 
In the closing chapter of The Moviegoer, Binx returns to the playground in 
Gentilly on Ash Wednesday after being dressed down by his Aunt Emily. 
Having abandoned his search, Binx relays the depths of his despair.  
Now in the thirty-first year of my dark pilgrimage on this earth and 
knowing less than I ever knew before, having learned only to recognize 
merde when I see it, having inherited no more from my father than a good 
nose for merde, for every species of shit that flies—my only talent—
smelling merde from every quarter, living in fact in the very century of 
merde, the great shithouse of scientific humanism where needs are 
satisfied, everyone becomes an anyone, a warm and creative person, and 
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prospers like a dung beetle, and one hundred percent of people are 
humanists and ninety-eight percent believe in God, and men are dead, 
dead, dead; and the malaise has settled like a fall-out and what people 
really fear is not that the bomb will fall but that the bomb will not fall—on 
this my thirtieth birthday, I know nothing and there is nothing to do but 
fall prey to desire. (228) 
It wasn’t an echo of Percy that I heard reverberating through Heidegger. I know 
how echoes work. Rather, I know they rarely traverse oceans or go backwards in 
time. What I had discovered reverberating through Percy’s writing was a 
variation on a theme. The passages shared a preoccupation with things and 
nothing, with catastrophe and despair, and with the apocalyptic image of their 
time: the atomic bomb. I was confused why both writers would refer to the bomb 
only to elude to a greater terror, some other conveyor of death that would make 
a person yearn for the bomb to fall. But I had to go to class. 
 Nearly a year later I found myself sitting beneath an 8x6 oil painting of a, 
former president of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. The portrait 
depicts a greying man seated casually in a chair, legs crossed at the knee, 
cigarette in hand, almost laughing. It hangs in the special collections room of 
Wilson Library, an imposing neo-classical building in the heart of campus. Before 
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his death, Percy arranged for the special collections department inside Wilson to 
house his papers and library. I was staring at the inside cover of Percy’s copy of 
Existence and Being, the first collection of Heidegger’s essays translated into 
English. Nearby a UNC undergrad watched me study the inside cover. She was 
tasked with watching other people read old books, some type of penance for 
effacing library property. The inside cover and title page are littered with 
references to pages accompanied by short notes, serving as a sort of reader’s 
table of contents. Above a sticker which depicts Percy’s crest, the first note 
appears. It reads 
Add (delta sign?) [unreadable] 
Heidggr – Existentiala  
236: motto 
I didn’t know archival research was supposed to be harder than this, so I simply 
followed the first note. On page 236, in a lengthy introductory chapter titled "An 
Account of 'The Four Essays'," by the book’s editor Werner Brock, Percy notes a 
key phrase, perhaps the motto he was referring to. It appears in a discussion of 
Heidegger's inaugural lecture at the University of Freiburg in 1929. The lecture, 
titled "What is Metaphysics" includes a substantial discussion on Heidegger's 
views on nothingness. For Heidegger, this nothingness presents an inescapable 
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problem for the self that is metaphysical in nature (Existence and Being 236). 
Heidegger posited that for a problem to register in the "metaphysical range" it 
must "[embrace] and [permeate] the whole realm of metaphysics" and it must 
cause the thinking being to call himself into question as well.” It is through a 
discussion of nothingness that Heidegger demonstrates these criteria. Through a 
discussion of Greek metaphysics, Christian dogmatics, and Hegel's "Logic," 
Heidegger sets out to prove that "nothingness," when it is not "clearly conceived 
as a problem," is "taken to be the metaphysical counterconception to what 
actually and substantially is; but that, if envisaged as a problem, it is seen to 
belong to the "Being" itself of all that is". Rather than take the old dictum ex 
nihilo nihil fit [from nothing, nothing comes to be] or the Christian response, ex 
nihilo fit-ens creatum [from nothing comes created being], both of which 
Heidegger argues are insufficient discussions of nothingness, Heidegger 
suggests the phrase  
ex nihilo omne ens qua ens fit [From the nothing all beings as beings come 
to be]. Only in the nothing of Dasein do beings as a whole, in accord with 




Percy's marginal annotation in the midst of this discussion draws attention to 
what I take to be the motto he mentions on the inside cover. He draws a line next 
to the phrase "Only through the transcending to 'nothingness' does man 
approach the things as what they are and only thus do they come truly into their 
own."  
I had heard it again. The refrain I first heard sitting atop my neighbors 
roof, reading a copy of Craft in Theory came back, this time in the sunny special 
collections room of Wilson library. It’s impossible for someone who spends most 
evenings reading Percy or critics like Luschei, Webb, and Hobbs, not to think of a 
moment like this in terms of Repetition. Repetition is, for Kierkegaard, a sudden 
confrontation with a time past. The juxtaposition of a moment in history and it’s 
repetition in the present, a type of déjà vu, thrusts the interim time into focus. 
Nothing dramatic happened in the library that day. There were no fugue states 
or road to Damascus moments. Instead the implications of the Repetition of this 
refrain crept into my periphery vision. For a brief moment, Percy’s single pencil 
line looked like a type of key, a form of secret knowledge. I was dazzlingly, 
naively optimistic. But in that moment, the last year of chasing after a 
Heideggerian mode of reading Percy came back and I began to see the ways in 
which a fuller engagement with the topics that garnered attention from Percy in 
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Heidegger’s thought could enable a fuller reading of the growth of protagonists 
like Will Barrett. 
I. Déjà vu’s 
Heidegger’s influence on Percy has been noted by both his biographers, 
and those who study his work. Since the late 1970s, critics have considered the 
relationship between Heidegger’s project and Percy’s fiction. The German 
philosopher’s influence was, however, frequently treated as ancillary to those 
other thinkers who influenced Percy’s early writing. William H. Poteat mentions 
Heidegger in “"Reflection’s on Walker Percy’s Theory of Language," but only to 
liken his notion of the Self to that of Buber, Sartre, and Marcel in a concluding 
remark (219). Similarly, in “Toward Home: The Last Gentleman,” Richard 
Pindell appropriates Heidegger’s definition of death, “that strange and 
unhomely thing that banishes us once and for all from everything in which we 
are at home” (63) to better explain Will Barrett’s reaction to Jamie vaught’s death 
in an unadorned, sterile hospital room outside Santa Fe. But Heidegger 
disappears from the discussion as quickly as he arrived. Thomas Leclair 
mentions Heidegger alongside Kierkegaard and Marcel as key philosophical 
influences in an article on Percy’s Lancelot entitled “Walker Pecy’s Devil,” but 
goes no further. In “Binx Bolling’s New Orleans,” Max Webb briefly discusses 
16 
 
the ways in which The Moviegoer dramatizes Heidegger’s argument that “the 
origin of philosophy lies in experiencing the question, ‘why are there essents 
[‘existents’ or ‘things that are’] rather than Nothing?’” (6). Webb argues that 
Binx’s “little way” in gentilly, is nothing more than an “uncommitted and 
undirected holding action”  (7) enacted between his first encounter with the 
overwhelming reality of the things in his immanent sphere in the Korean War, 
and his second awakening one morning in Gentilly. Yet Webb quickly moves 
away from the Heideggerian elements of Binx’s awareness and folds them into a 
discussion of the Russian Formalist idea of defamiliarization. Though he enacts a 
thorough exposition of Binx’s awakening into a more authentic mode of 
consciousness, he never engages fully with Heidegger’s concept of astonishment. 
These established critics were adept at establishing relationships between parts 
of Being and Time or Introduction to Metaphysics and Percy’s corpus, but they 
quickly moved away from the explicit deployment of Heideggerian terminology 
and ideas of reference in the text to discuss other philosophers’ influence. 
Martin Luschei’s The Sovereign Wayfarer contained the most useful 
discussion of Heidegger’s concepts among the major early works of Percy 
criticism. In the second chapter, “Some Light from the Existentialists,” Luschei 
explains how Percy borrows the term Alltäglichkeit, translated “Everydayness,” to 
describe the malaise which permeates modern life. Luschei places Heidegger in 
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dialogue with Kierkegaard to explain the manner in which modernity 
encourages a culture in which individual experience is tempered by the vast 
scope of possible knowledge and experience presented to them.  In short, since 
passion and intensity are finite, an individual’s attempt to embrace the full range 
of possibilities available in modern life results in a dispersal of passion and 
intensity and a corresponding lack of interest in the particular nature of his 
immediate surroundings.  Luschei, relying on authoritative interpreters of 
Heidegger’s work, argues that this condition is not irreversible. Though the self, 
or Heidegger’s Dasein, finds itself thrown into a world which is both disorienting 
and confusing, the capacity to reestablish a connection with Being, to adopt an 
alternative mode of “being-with-the-world” is open to man alone. It is this 
option, the possibility to resist or transcend the malaise, which is open to Percy’s 
protagonists (20-23). Though threatened by the prospect of retreating into a 
crowd, of becoming the anonymous “one” of Academic English, these 
protagonists are afforded the opportunity to adopt a different posture. Through a 
recognition of their own frailty and mortality, Percy’s protagonists become aware 
of the nearness of authentic existence. Though they arrive at varied points along 
the journey towards authentic existence, they each demonstrate a decision to 
adopt a different posture towards their surroundings (26). This decision is often 
less a decision than a compulsive response, but it requires them to reclaim their 
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sovereignty, to relate to the world as an individual rather than as a single data 
point in the tallies of social, natural, and physical scientists. 
Anita Bryan’s Dissertation, Coping With Modernity: A Heideggerian Reading 
of the Novels of Walker Percy offers thorough Heideggerian readings of all of 
Percy’s fiction. In brief, Bryan argues persuasively from Percy’s philosophical 
essays, his novels, and Heidegger’s Being and Time that Percy deploys  
aspects of Heidegger’s theories of time, language, Dasein, authentic and 
inauthentic existence, guilt, boredom, thinking, technology, and 
modernity to address the problem he saw with modem life, and especially 
the suburban, country-club culture of the South. (iv) 
For Bryan, Heidegger’s thought provided key components and terms which 
Percy put to work when crafting his theory of language, his thoughts on 
intersubjectivity, and his fiction. If the question for Percy and his critics is always 
“How can an individual learn to live and die in an authentic manner if they live 
in the suburbs, detached from the old Judeo-Christian and Stoic myths which 
guided earlier generations,” Bryan explores the Heideggerian register in which 
Percy answers that question. Like Luschei, Bryan identifies how Percy’s thoughts 
on the problems of everydayness, boredom, guilt, alienation, and abstraction are 
rooted in Heideggerian concepts. Yet rather than devote a few pages to 
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Heidegger’s influence in a chapter devoted to the impact of “existential thought” 
on Percy’s work, Bryan spends her entire book length manuscript applying 
Heidegger’s philosophy as expressed in Being and Time to Percy’s novels, offering 
detailed readings of each work. 
 Working through each of these sources over a year felt a little like being 
dropped off in the heart of a new city over and over again. I would venture out a 
little ways in each direction, find new bearings, and return to where I started. 
One year in, I had a vague idea of the terrain. I knew Heidegger’s terminology 
served as a cornerstone in Percy’s thinking. I knew that this role had been widely 
acknowledged and that widely read critics like Lewis Lawson and Martin 
Luschei had studied the Heideggerian terms that surface in Percy’s writing. I 
knew other scholars had incorporated Heideggerian language into their analysis 
of certain passages and that at least one person, Anita Bryan, had attempted a 
systematic reading of Percy’s canon through the lens of Heidegger’s Being and 
Time. For all that, I still felt like the newcomer to a city. I had a vague idea of the 
layout of the argument, but it seemed as if no one had mapped the way Percy’c 
anthropology, and consequently the way he developed characters, was 
influenced by Heidegger. It seemed to me that very few had attempted to rethink 
the nature of alienation and the reentry problem, two questions which are 
interwoven throughout Percy’s work, in light of Heidegger’s thought. 
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Specifically, it seemed that few, if any, of these writers had succeeded in 
reconciling Percy’s understanding of a species of alienation unique to the 
modern condition and Heidegger’s concepts of Dasein and Stimmung. I remained 
convinced that researching the intersection of Percy and Heidegger’s modes of 
thought would enable me to better explain, or perhaps simply name, the species 
of despair which preoccupied Percy throughout his life and which he brings 
forth in each of his protagonists. 
 The “motto” inscription was the first of perhaps 150 similar descriptions 
on the inside cover of a first edition printing of Existence and Being, a book 
published in 1949 which likely came into Percy’s possession sometime in the 
early 1950s. He published “Symbol as Hermeneutic in Existentialism,” a short 
discussion of the ways in which Anglo-American Empiricism and European 
existentialism offer potentially complimentary, and equally valid, insights in the 
June 1956 edition of Philosophy and Phenomenological research. In that article he 
makes frequent use of Heidegger’s terminology. He pays special attention to the 
existentialia of Dasein, and uses Heidegger’s terminology as his principle term 
for referring to the self. He also seems to posit a relationship between Dasein and 
its environment which appears to lean heavily on Heidegger’s conception of the 
various modes of being, Stimmung, which present themselves as options for the 
self. While Percy sidesteps the argument over whether the existentialia were 
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psychological, as Kierkegaard argued, or ontological, following Heidegger, he 
appears very familiar with Heidegger’s concept of Dasein and the various ways 
of being with, or tuning into, an environment. He knew all this by 1956, when 
Existence and Being, the little book of Heidegger’s essays and an accompanying 
introduction by Brock, was among very few English translations of the German 
philosopher’s work. 
 In her dissertation, Bryan assumes that Percy’s knowledge of German 
allowed him to read Being and Time during his convalescence. She follows Percy’s 
biographer Jay Tolson in this respect. Yet as I perused Percy’s copy of Existence 
and Being, it occurred to me that this thin book may have been Percy’s entryway 
into Heidegger’s thought. In the prefatory note of Existence and Being, Brock 
discusses the impact of Being and Time on philosophical study, but laments that it 
was not yet available in English. He writes "Although the essays presented here 
can make the reader acquainted with only a few aspects of the work of this 
contemporary thinker, it is hoped that they will prepare the ground for a more 
profound study of his thought, once "Being and Time" itself has been translated 
into English" (16-17). His goal, he explains, is to include a much lengthier 
introduction to these essays, so that they will be better understood by a public 
largely unfamiliar with Heidegger's work. Brock’s lament about the limited 
availability of Heidegger’s work and his acknowledgementselsewhere that 
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Heidegger’s German is particularly innovative and hard to translate, an 
observation backed up by George Steiner in his work Martin Heidegger, should 
give us pause when proceeding on the assumption that Percy worked his way 
through Heidegger’s text in the original German. While his German may have 
been sufficient or even fluent, I found myself asking if it were not more likely 
that Percy had begun his study of the philosopher’s works through Brock’s 
introduction. While impossible to prove, Percy’s marginalia in his copy of 
Existence and Being suggest that his reading interests and the ideas he espouses in 
“Symbol as Hermeneutic in Existentialism” were at the very least, strikingly 
similar. 
II. A Philosophy of Life: Dasein and Stimmung 
Brock devotes the early portion of the book to a brief explanation of 
Heidegger’s goals in Being and Time before moving into a discussion of the 
concept of Dasein. Heidegger's starting-point is not the perceptible things, but 
what he terms  
human "Dasein", a phenomenon fundamentally, i.e. in its ontological 
structure, not contemplated and not analysed [sic] by the Greeks or ever since 
in later philosophic tradition. His endeavour [sic] in this respect is to give an 
analysis of the "existentialia" and of the "existentialistic" structure of human 
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Dasein in a way in which the Greek thinkers developed the "categories of a 
thing that "is". (27)  
Percy draws special attention to Brock's discussion of the difference between 
dasein, literally being there, and everything else that exists, "vorhanden." Being has 
no genus, a point Percy rewrites in the margins. It has no class, it is always "my 
own "Dasein" (28). Percy also stars Brock's argument that  
It [Dasein] chooses and decides and may gain or may lose itself, inasfar as 
Being is concerned. ‘Those things which are ‘vorhanden’ are of a genus. They 
are a bicycle or a dog, ‘their essence is always ascertainable.’’(29)  
But Dasein differs from those objects which fall into the category of “vorhanden”, 
and here Percy chooses to underline, mark with a circle in the margins, and draw 
an arrow to Brock's sentence: "In contrast to them, the characteristics of 'Dasein' 
are not 'qualities,' but possible ways of 'Being'." Again he underlines: "'Da-sein' is 
to express not its 'essence', but its 'Being'; it means "Being there." "The 
fundamental characteristics of 'Dasein', corresponding to the categories of 
'Vorhandenheit', are therefore termed 'existentialia'" This is the terminology 
Percy appropriates in his essay "Symbol as Hermeneutic in Existentialism." The 
self’s submergence in place paired with its awareness of itself as “Being-with-the-
world” makes it utterly unlike the rest of the natural world, vorhanden. The self’s 
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astonishment at the predicament of its own existence is precisely the subject of 
“Symbol as Hermeneutic.” The self’s existential experience, the sensation of 
“being there,” is exactly what Anglo-American empiricism overlooks and where 
Existentialism begins its inquiry.   
Percy’s reading practices and marginalia in Existence and Being suggest that he 
turned to Heidegger and Brock to bridge the gap between empiricism and 
existentialism. He litters the margins with check marks and stars once again 
during an in depth discussion of Dasein and its relationship to human life. While 
many readers of Heidegger up to the time of Brock's writing had largely gotten 
stuck on his ontological definition of the Dasein (which Brock argues was simply 
a starting point) Heidegger intended to account for the "'existentialia' of 
Dasein...such phenomena as dread, care, and Being-towards-one's-death, the call 
of conscience and resolve," (37). It is here that Percy begins his underlining 
The philosophic study of human Dasein, though here undertaken from 
the unusual angle of a descriptive analysis of 'existentialia', seemed the 
more to fulfil a requirement of the age, as Nietzsche and particularly 
Dilthey and his school had long demanded a "philosophy of human life", 
as Simmel's philosophy had tended in the same direction and as Scheler 
had proclaimed the task of a 'Philosophical Anthropology' during the very 
years when 'Being and Time' was prepared and published. (37) 
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Long time readers of Percy know that his chief concern in both his fiction and his 
philosophical novels is the question of how an individual can live in the modern 
world, how he or she can reenter life from the stratospheric heights of scientific 
and philosophical analysis and live as a human being. In Heidegger, Percy found 
a fellow thinker who sought to seek out the roots of the modern malaise and 
offer an alternative “philosophy of human life,” one which enabled Dasein to 
engage with the immanent sphere authentically, that is without abdicating his or 
her sovereignty. 
The refrain, the strange repetition or preoccupation in both Percy’s and 
Heidegger’s writing, seems to hinge on this dichotomy between authentic and 
inauthentic existence. In Percy’s work, this dichotomy could be conceived as the 
difference between orthodoxy and heresy. The orthodox person lives 
authentically, the heretic, inauthentically. In his fiction and in his essays, 
however, Percy prefers a less black and white diagnosis of the malaise. 
Collapsing these categories leads to a facile conflation of the religious and 
metaphysical dimensions of Percy’s thought and fails to account for Heidegger’s 
influence on the author’s “philosophy of human life” which gives rise to his 
protagonists and their varied struggles. Authenticity and Inauthenticity are best 
understood as opposing directions on a continuum, not poles or static states of 
existence. This continuum charts various modes of “being-in-the-world.” The 
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word Heidegger uses for these modes of being is Stimmung. The German word 
carries a number of connotations. It is often rendered as “mood” or “climate,” 
but it also bears a likeness to the German word for tuning an instrument. Just as 
an instrument can be in or out of tune depending on the frequency it vibrates at, 
the Stimmung of Dasein can be inauthentic or authentic to the extent that it exists 
in radical astonishment at the peculiarity of its own existence. The existence of 
something rather than nothing is, to an authentically-calibrated Dasein, an 
overwhelming and shocking fact. It is the starting point for all future inquiries, 
metaphysical and otherwise. It is also the starting point from which each of 
Percy’s characters begin a pilgrimage into a richer engagement with the world 
around them, though the extent of their orthodoxy is left ambiguous.  
Though other existentialists developed similar categories and modes of 
thinking, Percy’s reading practices in Existence and Being suggest that he was 
fascinated by Heidegger’s terminology. Brock’s discussion of a Verfallen1 mode of 
being-in-the-world is marked in both pencil and pen, suggesting that Percy 
seems to have come back to this passage at least twice. Percy’s comments also 
appear in the margins and the passage is referenced in the “reader’s table of 
contents.” In this passage, Brock explains that Heidegger conceived of this 
                                                 
1 The word means doomed, expired, to go to waste, to decay. 
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stimmung, as a "mode of 'unauthentic'2 Existence and the structure of its inner 
'movement'" (56). The fallen state Heidegger describes "means primarily that 
Dasein is entirely concerned and occupied with the "world" of its care. But an 
undercurrent of its meaning is that Dasein lost itself in the publicity of the "one 
like many" and "in the "world" which belongs to its Being" (56).  Brock goes on to 
explain that the temptation of thinking of one's individual self as one of many is 
profoundly appeasing, but leads to a  
state of 'self-estrangement' (Entfremdung) in which its own innermost 
'potentiality of being' becomes concealed to it. However, this self-
estrangement which denies to Dasein its authentiity and best 
potentialities, as it were, locking it up from what it genuinely can be, does 
not hand it over to something which it is not itself, but presses it into 
unauthenticity, a potential mode of Being of itself; in it Dasein catches 
itself up and entangles itself (Sichverfangen). This way of inner movement 
of Dasein in its own Being is termed the 'fall' (Absturz)3: the Dasein falls 
from itself to itself, namely to the groundlessness and irrelevance of 
unauthentic everydayness. (57) 
                                                 
2 Circled in Percy’s Copy 
3 Circled in Percy’s Copy 
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Brock explains that this Verfallen state is grounded in a state of Dread, an 
overwhelming and life-defining fear which decouples the self from its 
potentiality, truncating its possibility for authentic existence.  
III. Dread and Bottoming Out 
Percy’s underlining suggests he was fascinated by this sense of indefinite 
yet viscerally real dread which accompanies Heidegger’s fall. For Dasein existing 
in a Verfallen mode of Being, the ultimate fear is that  
what is threatening is nowhere4. It is somehow there--and yet nowhere, 
very close and oppressing--and yet nowhere. What is dreaded reveals 
itself as 'it is nothing and nowhere'; but the atmosphere of profound 
averseness and oppression implied in the 'nothing and nowhere' indicates 
that what is dreaded is yet "something", namely "the world as such". (60-
61) 
This, I suggest, is the “transcending to nothing” which Percy took an interest in. 
The dread that emerges when contemplating the possibility of non-existence, of 
nothing, of annihilation, enacts a type of reversal. It is a step above and beyond 
mere disenchantment with the modern world. The wholesale rejection of the 
world, the end point of a festering revulsion to all things physical and immanent 
                                                 
4 Arrows are drawn to this point in Percy’s Copy. 
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contains within it the seeds of an alternative, and, for Percy, more authentic, 
mode of being. This alternative Stimmung is characterized by radical 
astonishment at the existence of things.  
In Martin Heidegger, another early commentary on the philosopher’s work, 
the author, George Steiner, argues that Heidegger's philosophy of existence and 
methodology are grounded in radical astonishment. As he puts it, "just this fact 
that being is gathered together in Being, that in the appearance of Being being 
appears, astonished the Greeks and first astonished them and them alone." 
Steiner restates Heidegger's articulation of the role of philosophy as being 
"incessantly astonished at and focused on the fact that all things are" (27). "The 
endeavor to think Being" is philosophy’s task. It attempts to be perennially 
astonished by the fact that Being is, that it indwells all being (27). Dread is 
undercut by Dasein’s recognition of itself as both a part, and observer of, the 
immanent, physical world. The attempt to transcend to the roots of Dread, a 
literal seeking after “nothing,” becomes the mechanism by which Dasein can 
experience the type of astonishment Heidegger identifies as the cornerstone of 
authentic being and thinking. At the pinnacle of Dread, an alternative mood or 
attunement presents itself and Dasein reverts to an authentic mode of being-in-
the-world. The kind of nothingness that would make a character like Binx 
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Bolling long for the bomb to drop and finish the levelling and desensitizing work 
of modernity, was the type of realization  
At the end of the trail, there wasn’t a single Heideggerian echo, 
reverberating through Percy’s fiction. Walker Percy was a thorough reader of 
continental and existential philosophy, and his engagement with Heidegger, like 
his appropriation of Kierkegaard and Sartre in his fiction, was always a 
refraction, bent to serve the purposes of his project.  But I had found, in both his 
marginalia and his early philosophical writings, a new line of thought to pursue, 
one which promised a richer reading of Percy’s protagonist, Will Barrett. 
Understanding the ways in which Percy incorporates Heidegger’s conceptual 
frameworks is important both to understanding the progression of Percy’s 
thought, better understanding the turn from inauthentic existence which Will 
Barrett begins in The Last Gentleman and completes by the close of The Second 
Coming. Will is, first and foremost, a southerner with an “excellent radar.” Over 
the next two chapters, I examine Will’s radar through Heidegger’s concepts of 
Dasein and Stimmung. Though Will has the capacity to tune into the world in 
ways which his contemporaries cannot, his fine radar is often jammed by 
conflicting signals. His “attunement” is off. This Heideggerian approach to both 
novels offers a fascinating way of reading Will’s various modes of existence, 
foregrounding the manner in which competing Stimmungen impact Will’s 
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Chapter 2: Mapping the Affective World of Will Barrett 
There is no such thing, strictly speaking, as a literature of alienation. In the 
representing of alienation the category is reversed and becomes something entirely 
different. 
     -Walker Percy “The Man on the Train” 
Will Barrett suffers from an acute nervous condition, one which causes 
him to slip into fugue states, “fall out,” and rediscover himself, hours or days 
later, suffering from amnesia in a strange location. He feels good only in bad 
situations. He imagines being pursued out of New York City, where he had been 
sojourning away from the south, back through the New South by a pack of 
“ravenous particles” which continue to pursue him until he leaves to head west. 
Through all of this, he prides himself on his “objectivity” and attention to 
“evidence.” Will Barrett is not well. But, as both The Last Gentleman and The 
Second Coming demonstrate repeatedly, he is not entirely wrong. Though Will’s 
sanity is called into question, he is also consistently likened to a radio receiver, 
capable of tuning into frequencies which are simply white noise to his 
companions. This ability distinguishes him from the long line of melancholic, 
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wealthy white male southern sojourners in the north from which he descends. If 
Barrett belongs to the tradition of “Quentin Compsons who did not kill 
themselves” as Percy once suggested5, it is this ability, this capacity to not only 
detect signals but to distinguish them from entropy which enables him to 
survive.  
The family likeness Barrett shares with his precursors in southern fiction 
has been widely noted, as has The Last Gentleman’s explicit engagement with 
traditions within existential and Catholic thought. Yet the role Will’s melancholia 
plays in unearthing the root causes of his nervous condition have been 
overlooked, in part because his ways of conceptualizing his predicament are 
easily disposed of as figurative language or the “worlding” of a mentally 
unstable central character6. Ravenous particles, deja vus, the sense that gravity is 
increasing, the repeated suggestion that radio signals are bleeding into one 
another or are overcome with static, these are the ways Barrett describes his own 
predicament. They all position him in a field in which particles and signals 
bombard him. Attention paid to Will’s various literary precursors and Percy’s 
participation in the southern, Catholic, and existential tradition has created a 
productive vein of discourse in the last forty years, but by turning attention to 
                                                 
5 See Conversations with Walker Percy p. 300 
6 The narrator mentions that Will took many classes in electronics while he served in the Army. 
This could explain why, when he is attempting to articulate his symptoms or worlding, he uses 
the types of terms I’m interested in, terms which deal with fields and particles and forces. 
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the ways Will theorizes his predicament in rather explicitly Heideggerian and 
affective terminology enables a rethinking of the ways these three traditions 
overlap7. Particularly, affect theory provides a way of thinking through Will’s 
melancholic reaction against the increasingly modernizing world of the 
American south, as well as his inability to successfully navigate his reentry out of 
the transcendent world of thought and scientific inquiry, into the immanent 
world of his immediate sphere. 
In this paper, I use Jonathan Flatley’s conception of affective mapping as a 
guide to read the first of Walker Percy’s Will Barrett novels: The Last Gentleman.  
Doing so does more than provide a novel way of reading Will’s melancholic 
response to the modern world. Reading the novel to uncover the mechanism by 
which Will’s sensitivity and abnormal reactions to the world around him 
becomes a site of productive knowledge creation brings Percy’s philosophical 
conceptualizations of language, fiction, and alienation into the foreground. In 
short, deploying Flatley’s style of reading for affective mapping technologies 
exposes both the historical roots of Will’s melancholy and what Lewis A. Lawson 
                                                 
7 I think that thinking through the way Percy describes Will’s alienation and melancholy is very 
much in line with Heidegger’s concept of Strimmond which Flatley describes. Percy’s copies of 
Heidegger are among the more thoroughly annotated books in his papers collected at UNC. 
Flatley also provides a way of discussing Will’s relationship to modernity which could be 
productively used to better explain the relationship between the three strains of criticism. I 
haven’t found anyone doing this, but I have found plenty of people trying to synthesize the way 
one or two areas of Percy studies overlap. 
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calls the “indirect communications” between Percy’s philosophy and his fiction, 
clarifying the nature and symptoms of Will’s malaise and the ways his 
melancholizing serves as the starting point for his recovery. Most importantly, it 
enables an exposition of Will’s plight that focuses on the ways his alienation 
emerges from his inherited habit of thinking of himself as a transcendent mind 
incapable of reentering an immanent world8.  
I. Map Collecting 
In the opening pages of Affective Mapping, Jonathan Flatley asserts a short, 
perplexing statement: “not all melancholias are depressing” (1). Aristotle noted a 
strange concentration of melancholics among philosophers and statesmen. 
Robert Burton argued that he got his knowledge by melancholizing, or 
purposefully deploying melancholy. Flatley argues that some melancholias are 
productive of knowledge. Not only can melancholia descend on an individual 
and cause them to depart from every day activities, it can trigger an intense 
                                                 
8 The trajectory of Will’s gradual transformation throughout The Last Gentleman and The Second 
Coming has been dsicussed by Marion Montgomery in With Walker Percy at the Tupperware Party 
as a journey from heresy, Gnostic dualism, towards Orthodoxy, as articulated in the Thomist 
view of the goodness of the created world.  While this is an important movement within the 
novels to take into consideration, one raised to prominence by the pervasive presence of the 
Catholic Church throughout the text, I focus instead on the ways in which the novels function as 
a dramatization of the reentry problem which Percy addresses most directly in Sutter’s casebook 
in LG. Percy’s essay “The Loss of the Creature” and Lost in the Cosmos devote significant time to 
this problem as does his essay collection The Message in the Bottle. I focus in this paper on the 
reentry problem because I believe it is the more central problem dealt with in The Last Gentleman, 




interest in the outside world by inciting a desire to understand the root cause of 
one’s condition. Flatley goes further, arguing that if melancholia, as posited by 
Freud, is a deeply felt attachment to a lost object, and if, as Benjamin argued, it is 
a shared condition of modern life, evidence of the historicity of subjectivity and 
symptomatic of a more widely felt revulsion to modernity, then melancholia can 
act as an impetus for “affective mapping” projects carried out in communities. 
Flatley writes “melancholia forms the site in which the social origins of our 
emotional lives can be mapped out and from which we can see the other persons 
who share our losses and are subject to the same social forces” (3). He argues that 
the subjects of his study, James, Du Bois, and Platonov, explore “the place[s] 
where modernity touches down in our lives in the most intimate of ways.” 
Acting as cartographers, they map the affective terrain of modernity by 
melancholizing. Their art does not supplant the melancholic affect, but provides 
a guide to its root causes in history.  
In “The Man on the Train,9” Walker Percy articulates a similar vision of 
community among those who suffer from alienation as a result of their 
                                                 
9 The essay was originally published in a 1956 edition of Partisan Review under 
the title “The Man on the Train: Three Existential Modes,” a title which sheds 
considerably more light on the nature of the essay and emphasizes the ways in 
which this conception of “aesthetic reversal” depends on Kierkegaard’s use of 
“Alienation,” “Repetition,” and “Rotation.” Percy later collected the essay 
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immersion in modern life. The essay diagnoses the despair of two different 
commuters returning home after work. One, commuter A, sits quietly, “seeing 
the passing scene as a series of meaningful projects full of signs which he reads 
without difficulty” (84). Commuter B, though he can pin down no empirical 
reason for feeling as he does, is alienated “although he has satisfied the same 
empirical needs as commuter A” (84).  For Percy, it is exactly this discourse of 
needs fulfillment which gives rise to the commuter’s Alienation. When the 
commuter “reads books on mental hygiene which abstract immanent goals from 
existence…he comes to despair.” (85) Commuter B has an alternative option. In 
Percy’s essay, it is art which affects what he calls “the aesthetic reversal of 
alienation.” The afflicted commuter spends his time reading a book about an 
alienated man riding a train. Before he could not speak his despair, but the 
author gives a name to it10, not through re-presentation, but through “the 
polarizing crystal” of art which “makes a quantitative division among existential 
traits accordingly as it transmits some more or less intact, reverses some, and 
selectively polarizes others, transmitting certain elements and canceling 
others”(85-86). 
                                                                                                                                                 
alongside other thoughts on language, the nature of the novel, and 
intersubjectivity in The Message in the Bottle. 
10 For a further discussion of the significance which Percy attributed to the naming function, see 
“Metaphor as Mistake” in The Message in the Bottle. 
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Placing Flatley’s conception of melancholy as affective technology over 
Percy’s discussion of alienation and its reversal requires several clarifications, 
especially before applying this map to the text of The Last Gentleman. First, 
melancholy in Flatley’s conception cannot be collapsed into Percy’s conception of 
existential alienation. Alienation in Percy’s philosophical writings and his fiction 
is triggered by the breakdown of intersubjectivity. Whether or not the characters 
are aware of this plight, they find themselves incapable of intersubjectivity and 
move towards solipsism accompanied by a rejection of the immanent, physical 
world. Alienation, then, is a subspecies of melancholia in which the lost love 
object is one’s connection to the outside world and to other subjects. Though 
their views of the particulars of its origins are somewhat divergent, both authors 
locate the historical roots of this melancholy in the advent of modernity11. They 
also both posit it as an affect, though Percy does not specifically employ this 
terminology. Flatley explicitly acknowledges his debts to Heidegger, specifically 
in the use the term Stimmung for one’s way of being in the world. Often 
translated as “attunement,” Stimmung for Heidegger is the filter through which 
                                                 
11 Percy’s primary quarrel is with modern epistemology, specifically modernity’s 
tendency to establish the self as a transcending mind over and against the self as 
organism in an environment, reducing the act of choice to biological determinism 
and the needs of the self to biological/psychological need fulfillment. He does not 
however suggest there was a time when intersubjectivity was easy. I don’t think 
it would be overstating the point to say that for Percy, humanity’s predicament is 
this sense of lost intersubjectivity. See “Loss of the Creature,” “Metaphor as 
Mistake,” “Message in the Bottle” in The Message in the Bottle.    
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the Dasein (self: literally “being there”) experiences the world.  In Percy’s novel, 
Will Barrett’s “radar” enables him to sense the “particles” and “waves” 
resonating through the immediate sphere around him, but his attunement is 
habitually out of sync. His alienation stems both from his struggle to parse the 
entropy in his environment and his inability to accept the systems proffered by 
his fellow southerners, his father, Sutter, and Val.  
It is helpful to incorporate Sarah Ahmed’s discussion of Husserl’s 
immediate sphere in her article “Happy Objects,” to better understand Will’s 
particular struggle. Ahmed argues that the way we discuss happiness suggests 
“that happiness starts from somewhere other than the subject who may use the 
word to describe a situation” (29). In this discussion, she employs the term affect 
to label the “sticky” substance which binds people to socially circulated goods 
(objects that make an individual happy). But Ahmed also incorporates a 
discussion of the communities that determine the value of these goods. To 
facilitate this discussion, she employs a framework developed by Husserl which 
helps her to argue that “happiness can thus be described as intentional in the 
phenomenological sense (directed toward objects), as well as being affective 
[experienced as a result of](contact with objects)” (32).As in Percy and Flatley’s 
formulations, this substance seems to emanate/circulate within a field which the 
self is submerged within, a field which Husserl and Ahmed call the “sphere of 
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practical action” (32). Ahmed’s essay’s locus is the family and the “affect aliens” 
who fail to recognize the goodness of certain happy objects circulated by the 
family. As with Heidegger’s terminology, this discussion of the family’s 
circulation of social goods within the “sphere of practical action” provides a 
conceptual bridge between Percy and Flatley, allowing for a more precise 
discussion of Will Barrett’s relationships with the several Families who enter his 
world and the “ravenous particles” which he believes contribute to his various 
medical disabilities. 
II. Ideas of Reference: Hollow Men, Noxious Particles, and Ultimate Truths 
 However well or unwell Will may be, he is repeatedly positioned in the 
novel as a knight for whom the loss of intersubjectivity gives occasion for a 
quest. His disease is the impetus for his task. Early in the novel, the narrator 
gives a brief history of Will Barrett’s “nervous condition” in strangely positive 
terms. Will  
Suffered spells of amnesia and even between times did not quite know 
what was what. Much of the time he was like a man who has just crawled 
out of a bombed building. Everything looked strange. Such a predicament, 
however, is not altogether a bad thing. Like the sole survivor of a bombed 
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building, he had no secondhand opinions and he could see things afresh. 
(11) 
He believes he is bombarded by “deja vus” and “ravenous particles.” He slips in 
and out of fugue states throughout the novel. He frequently endures bouts of 
amnesia, and though he can “snow” many people, in group situations he feels 
overcome by sadness in happy circumstances, sadness triggered by the 
expectation that he meet unspoken expectations of joviality. Yet the very 
strangeness which alienates him from the world is not the result of the dullness 
of his perception or a particularly abstracted mind. He can sense things which 
others cannot, as demonstrated by his success in helping Jamie Vaught navigate 
the last days of his life, his brief career tutoring young, withdrawn Jewish youths 
(19), and his ability to help a mute mental patient in Connecticut talk. Will tunes 
“his amiable Southern radar to these rarefied and arcane signals which until he 
came along had roamed their lonely stratosphere unreceived” (19). Occasionally, 
his radar’s sensitivity overwhelms his senses. These moments, when he is 
assaulted by “deja vus” or “ravenous particles” and enters a fugue state, 
fascinate him. His dislocated state makes him all the more fascinated in the 
world12. 
                                                 
12 Percy discusses this phenomenon in his essay “Loss of the Creature” also contained in The 
Message in the Bottle.  
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 It is one of these experiences in the museum which triggers Will’s decision 
to return to the south, an initial step towards reentering the immanent world. 
While visiting the Metropolitan Museum, he begins to sense the presence of 
“ravenous particles…stealing the substance from painting and viewer alike” (26).  
The particles prevent Will from looking at the paintings himself, and so he 
watches a man watching the painting, “standing on his shoulders” as a way of 
“getting around the ravenous particles.”  He stands behind a pillar “shivering 
and sweating” as the painting becomes increasingly invisible to him. He feels the 
particles closing in, “gravity increased so that it was all he could do to keep from 
sinking to all fours.” Suddenly, a skylight crashes down at his feet, coating the 
museum patrons in “white, glass powdered to sugar,” transforming them into 
“pillars of salt.” Immediately afterwards the realization that everyone is safe 
incites the other patrons, all strangers, to hug one another and shed tears of joy 
(28). Barrett gains a second benefit from the “cataclysm.” The falling skylight 
enables Barrett to momentarily escape his intense isolation and alienation, 
allowing him to see a painting “glowing like a jewel.” The event disposes of the 
particles temporarily and intensifies his interest in his affliction.    
Throughout the early portions of the novel, Will positions himself as an 
objective observer of the world around him. Will “had to know everything before 
he could do anything” (4). He is “an engineer in a deeper sense” (41), determined 
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to understand the world and engineer his life accordingly. But as the narrator 
informs the reader after the incident in the museum, 
He had, of course, got everything twisted around. Though he took pride 
in his “objectivity” and his “evidence,” what evidence there was, was 
evidence of his own deteriorating condition. If there were any “noxious 
particles” around, they were, as every psychologist knows, more likely to 
be found inside his head than in the sky. (28-29) 
Though shot through with sarcasm and irony, the manner in which the 
narrator’s satire functions is bafflingly ambiguous. Will’s diseased state is rather 
apparent, but by invoking the authority of “every psychologist” the narrator calls 
his own assertion into question13. Though Will’s expertise is lacking, and his 
                                                 
13 For a further discussion of the “involuted irony” which Percy’s characters and narrators 
frequently employ when leveling their most pointed critiques, see Mary Thale’s 
“The Moviegoer of the 1950s.” Thale focuses her attention on Binx Bolling’s way 
of redirecting suffering and hatred for the “sure well-fed world of the 1950’s” to 
comedic ends (86).  She argues that Binx’s ironic tone enables him to avoid the 
“heaviness which so often pervades the philosophical ‘search’ novel” (85). Binx 
speaks directly, but he delivers his blows in an ironic tone which can be mistaken 
for humor. This tone reveals a “deeper gulf” between him and the dead 
suburbanites his life parodies than an indignant or contemptuous tone would. It 
also stages the gulf between Binx’s detached, critical mind, and his desire for a 
way of transcending “everydayness.” Thale’s analysis succeeds by diagnosing a 
key component of the modern malaise in Percy’s fiction, a “rage-turned-to-irony 
for the world that is” (89) which Binx expresses through his criticisms of his 
neighbors and family members. The narrator of The Last Gentleman uses similar 
jokes and backhanded statements to deliver the most incisive remarks, but I’ve 
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concepts for explaining his condition seem to be grafted onto the field of 
psychology and ontology from his limited education in electronics received 
during his service in the U.S. Army (17), they locate the problem in the outside 
world, the “sphere of practical action,” and thereby outside the purview of 
psychoanalysis. As questionable as Will’s judgments and conceptual maps may 
be, they are the foundation of his subsequent searching throughout the novel, 
even after his analyst informs him that he is approaching the brink of yet another 
mental breakdown. 
After his experience in the museum Will tells his analyst that rather than 
continue in therapy, he intends to test his radar receiving capabilities in the 
world outside. After enduring “almost five years as an object of technique, 
however valuable,” Will tells Dr. Gamow “he thought maybe he’d go to the other 
side, become one of them, the scientists” (35). Dr. Gamow responds with a 
summary of Will’s symptoms, warning him that his decision to follow the 
Vaughts out of New York and back to the South will result in a relapse. “May I 
review for you one or two facts?” the analyst asks, 
                                                                                                                                                 
yet to find an effective  way of dealing with the narrator’s direct commentary on 
the text. Yet the mere fact that the narrator’s comments are constantly called into 
question through this baffling deployment of irony, involuted or otherwise, 
participates in the text’s larger critique of “expertise” and “technique,” words 
which Percy frequently associates with the most dangerous abdications of 
sovereignty demanded of the self by scientific “authorities.” 
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Number one, you have had previous fugue states. Number two, you give 
every indication of having another. You always quit the analysis and you 
always buy something expensive before taking off. The last time it was a 
Corvette. You still have a defective ego structure, number three. Number 
four, you develop ideas of reference. This time it is hollow men, noxious 
particles, and ultimate truths. (38-39) 
The clinical tone Dr. Gamow affects in this cataloguing of Will’s deficiencies 
disturbs him. It reminds him of stolen glances at Dr. Gamow’s notes, the curious 
sensation of seeing oneself described as a “well-developed and nourished young 
white male…with a pleasing demeanor.” The Doctor’s reduction of his existence 
to a specimen and subject of analysis unnerves him but he does not reject 
Gamow’s premises or his observations and Barrett resolves to “engineer the 
future of [his] life according to the scientific principles and the self-knowledge 
[he has] so arduously gained from five years of analysis” (41).  If the sense of 
being “hollowed out” which Will continuously tries to explain, or his fear that he 
is pursued by particles, or the notion of seeking out “ultimate truths” seems 
crazy, it appears to Will to be a an equally valid, and highly preferable 
alternative to the Doctor’s years of analyzing slips of the tongue and dream 
associations. In taking responsibility for his analysis, Will takes a step towards 
unearthing a cause of his alienation and experiencing an alternative mode of 
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being-in-the-world, but several of the hypotheses and cures which he develops 
begin to fail him as soon as he heads south. 
 Will agrees to accompany Jamie and the Vaughts to the south as Jamie’s 
tutor, convincing himself that he is engineering his future according to the 
soundest of all wisdom. Stopped on the side of the road in Northern Virginia, 
Will gazes at himself in a steel mirror, locates himself in his new surroundings, 
and recalls his task: 
My name is Williston Bibb Barrett, he said aloud, consulting his wallet to 
make sure, and I am returning to the South to seek my fortune and restore 
the good name of my family, perhaps even recover Hampton plantation 
from the canebrakes and live out my days as a just man and little father to 
the faithful Negroes working in the fields…I shall marry me a wife and 
live me a life in the lovely green environs of Atlanta or Memphis or even 
Birmingham, which, despite its bad name, is known to have lovely people. 
(151) 
No hollow sensations or hollow men. No noxious or ravenous particles. No 
search for “ultimate truths.” Safely outside New York and back on Confederate 
soil, Will frames his return as escaping to the simple, agrarian life, of his 
forefathers as well as a rejection of Northern thinking, which he enacts through 
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his recuperation efforts on Birmingham’s behalf. Fleeing from the north is for 
Will both an escape from the transcending mindset of modernity and the life he 
leads between his sleeping hours in the YMCA and his working hours in the 
basement of Macy’s department store. But Will’s escape southward is just that: 
an escape. His change of place does not provide a means of navigating his 
reentry problem, largely because upon his return, he is bombarded with the 
same forces which chased him out of the North. 
 The South he imagines returning to, like the autocthonous ideal of the 
agrarians, is little more than an image: enticing, yet ahistorical, unfounded in 
reality, dangerously misleading14. Along the Tidewater, this image is “pickled 
and preserved and decorous,” but everywhere else Barrett visits on his trip home 
is modernizing. On a clear night on a “raw red hillside” of Georgia, Will steps 
out behind the motel where his camper is parked and watches a construction 
gang hard at work. The night air “throbbed with machinery,” the “floodlights 
over the hill spoiled the night like a cast in a black eye,” and Barrett thinks to 
himself how common this type of scene has become in the south. He notes that, 
unlike the historic, cultural centers of the south, 
                                                 
14 See Louis D. Rubin’s introduction to I’ll Take My Stand 
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Backcountry everything was being torn down and built anew. The earth 
itself was transformed overnight, gouged and filled, flattened and hilled, 
like a big sandpile. The whole South throbbed like a diesel. (169) 
Immediately it comes over him again, “the old itch for omniscience” (170).  The 
mere contact with the forces modernizing the south ignites the old desire to 
break out of the contingencies and limits of knowing within the immanent 
sphere into a transcendent realm where knower can abstract himself from 
known. He transforms immediately from “American and horny,” to “English 
and eavesdropper,” because he wants to “know without being known” (170). He 
listens in on Rita and Kitty Vaught’s conversation, in which Kitty idealizes her 
return south. Playing the eavesdropper, he hears a near perfect facsimile of his 
return-to-the-old-planation fantasy delivered by Kitty and mocked by Rita, but 
he does not register its importance to him. He is possessed again by the desire for 
transcendent knowledge and he all but forgets the trajectory of reentry he had 
planned before he can register Rita’s critique. 
III. Bad Doctors Drink Bad Bourbon 
 Instead of returning to the old Plantation at Hampton, Will arrives at the 
Vaught home, “A castle fronting on a golf links set down in a beautiful green 
valley across a ridge from a city” (189). Unlike the south he left, the south he 
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returns to is “happy, victorious, Christian, rich, patriotic and Republican” (185). 
Accustomed to living in the “bombed out” (185) cities of the North, places in 
which he can feel at home because he “was homeless,” Will reenters a south in 
which everyone but him seems to be comfortable, successful, and victorious, 
living in a perpetual state of “almost invincible happiness” (186). He is 
“determined to be as happy as anyone” (186), but immediately his condition 
worsens. He feels the assaults of those strange forces emanating in his 
environment which he calls “deja vus.” His memory worsens, he wakes without 
knowing where he is, his “knee” leaps up at inopportune moments and he 
modifies his pockets to hold his “patella” in place (187)15. Most importantly, he 
has to compete with others who’s “radars were as sensitive as his own” (187), 
unlike the “post-Protestant Yankees” whose capacities for sensing things—the 
moods of others, the significance of certain lost values, the deleterious effects of 
the noxious particles—is, according to Will, horribly inept. Yet because Will’s 
radar is remarkable “even for the South” (187), his amnesia intensifies, to the 
point where “he forgot things he had seen before, but things he had heard of and 
not seen looked familiar” (188). Gripped by his amnesia, Will alienates himself 
by sliding back into his habit of “pondering, as usual, the mystery of the 
singularity of things” (188). 
                                                 
15 Certainly one of Percy’s longest sustained euphemisms. It runs through both 
Will Barrett novels. 
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 Here Ahmed’s discussion of happiness is helpful in elucidating the nature 
of Will’s alienation. Those objects in his immediate sphere which incite happiness 
in others—the newly constructed highway, the growing suburbs, the peculiar 
castle constructed on the fairway—intensify his sense of dislocation. If his return 
home was imagined as a return to the familiar, familial setting of the agrarian 
upper crust, he has discovered instead a new family of southerners, one 
possessed of a different sense of virtue and the good life than the old stoic order 
of his father. In “Happy Objects,” Ahmed posits that objects circulate socially 
and that their presence in our immediate sphere can affect us in the much the 
same way that Will’s “radar” or “receiver” interprets incoming signals from the 
world around him. The signals which others send about the objects in this 
sphere, the emergent new south, baffle Will. The “sticky” conceptual substance 
which bonds other southerners to “good” objects, has no effect on Will, 
alienating him further. Ahmed calls those who experience no attraction to the 
object, “affect aliens.” For these individuals, the loss of a loved object is doubly 
poignant because they are distanced from the object and their family members. 
In Will’s case, it is almost as if the attraction is more magnetic than “sticky” and 
his polarity has been reversed. When he returns to the south, the homogeneity of 
happy southerners in his immediate sphere intensifies the force of his alienation 
and quickens his expulsion from the immanent sphere. In this alienated state, the 
51 
 
only alternative, for Ahmed and for Will, is to form alternative communities to 
the family. In Will’s case, he finds that he has rather serendipitously fallen in 
with a fellow affect alien with whom he shares a number of similarities: Sutter 
Vaught. 
 Jamie Vaught is the first to note the similarity. When he asks Will for his 
thoughts on a quiet afternoon in August, Will tells him he is meditating on 
whether it would be better to walk into Memphis in one’s right mind, 
remembering everything, or whether it would be preferable to be an amnesiac. 
Jamie recognizes the abstracted, melancholic, strain of thought and labels it. 
“You sound like Sutter,” he says. Will’s dislocation and his fascination with 
unearthing “the singularity of things” [emphasis added] links the two. Sutter, 
Jamie’s older brother, is a gifted doctor turned coroners assistant. The oldest 
child of the Vaught family, once married to Rita, Sutter’s melancholic 
philosophizing, his habit of prescribing extended stays in the terminal ward to 
depressed wealthy southerners, and his insatiable appetite for, and 
preoccupation with, pornography and forbidden sexuality, cost him his marriage 
and his job. Like Will, Sutter suffers from a sense that something is not right in 
the new south but as a standout diagnostician who can all but diagnose a patient 
by looking at them, Sutter can name the despair in a way Will cannot. This is 
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attractive to Will and as his time at the Vaught house goes on, he finds himself 
peculiarly drawn to Sutter. 
 Will’s relationship with Sutter is complicated from the start by the 
doctor’s unwillingness to take on a disciple and Will’s unease about the doctor. 
Upon hearing that Sutter drives an Edsel  
to remind him of the debacle of the Ford Motor Company and to 
commemorate the last victory of the American people over marketing 
research and opinion polls…the engineer wasn’t sure he liked the sound 
of this. It had the sound of a quixotic type who admires his own gestures. 
(188) 
Will’s physical descriptions of Sutter are equally strange. His account of Sutter 
stresses his thinness, his near absence from the physical world. Barrett notes that 
“he was thin as a child is thin, with a simple scanting of flesh on bones…it was 
the sort of thinness a young man worries about. But this man did not…He did 
not hold himself in such a way as to minimize it” (206). Will’s curiosity about 
Sutter’s absurd little gesture and his physical abnormality leads him to explore 
Sutter’s apartment. In it he finds only a bottle of “three-dollar whiskey16” in the 
                                                 
16 The presence of cheap bourbon in the apartment, to a reader of Percy is more 
or less a smoking gun. This man is a bad doctor, seeking sensation and 
stimulation by means of anesthetizing his cerebral cortex with C2H5OH, not a 
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kitchenette and a hole in the wall which Will can use to see from his apartment 
into Sutter’s. Later Will discovers where the hole came from while playing the 
voyeur. Sutter returns to the apartment and, after bouts of quasi-philosophical 
melancholizing, sipping cheap bourbon, and arguing with Rita, discharges his 
pistol in the general direction of a picture of “The Old Arab Physician17”. In the 
aftermath of the shot, the two men meet.  
                                                                                                                                                 
man, indulging in an aesthetic repetition as a method of reentering the immanent 
world. See his essay “Bourbon,” collected as part of “Life in the South” in 
Signposts in a Strange Land. He actually prescribes the experience of returning 
home after a long day and pouring a glass of bourbon as a way of counteracting 
the same “noxious particles” which pursue Barrett across the landscape of the 
north and the south. Also, see the closing moments of the final sci-fi fable in Lost 
in the Cosmos. The alternative endings, one good, one bad, show the protagonist 
downing, in one case a homebrewed jar of yellow corn liquor, in the other , 
something only described as “kelp wine.” 
17 Possibly Abou Ben Adhem or Ishāq ibn ʻ Alī al-Ruhāwī. Physician Ishāq ibn 
ʻ Alī al-Ruhāwī whose work was built on the work of Hippocrates and Galen, 
was an early medical ethicist credited with developing a system of peer review 
that allowed patients to sue for malpractice if the doctor’s peers judged his 
methods to be questionable much as Sutter was banned from the hospital despite 
his successes. Al-Ruhawi’s best known work, Adab al-Talib (“Practical Ethics of 
the Physician” or “Practical Medical Deontology”) argued that doctors were 
guardians of both souls and bodies. For accounts of al Ruhawi’s role in medical 
history, see Prioreschi, Plinio (2001). A History of Medicine: Byzantine and Islamic p. 
394. For details regarding his role in the development of medical ethics, see 
Levey, Martin (1967). "Medical Ethics of Medieval Islam with Special Reference 
to Al-Ruhāwī's "Practical Ethics of the Physician"". In The Last Physician: Walker 
Percy and the Moral Life of Medicine, Carl Elliot suggests it is Ben Adhem and the 
image is a saccharine depiction of the old arab physician helping the poor. He 
also argues that this is a turning point in the novel, where the focus shifts from 
the relationship between Will and Kitty to the relationship between Will and 
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 Sutter’s absurd, yet forceful, stands, his penchant for cheap liquor, his 
melancholic ramblings, his dismissal from his job, his way of standing, these 
details conspire to reveal that he is a bad doctor, capable perhaps of diagnosing 
the body but, because of his own nearly unembodied state, unable tune himself 
into the world in any real sense. Yet upon encountering Sutter for the first time 
face to face just moments after hearing the pistol discharged, Will is insistent on 
hearing Sutter’s diagnosis of his condition. Now a pathologist, not a doctor, 
Sutter informs him that he studies “the lesions of the dead” (218), but Will 
continues to petition Sutter 
 “But I have reason to believe you can help me.” 
 “What reason?”  
 “I can tell when somebody knows something I don’t know.” 
 “You think I know something?” (218) 
Will’s radar alerts him to the fact that he has found someone with a type of 
knowledge, someone who is similarly unhappy though immersed in the 
“invincible happiness” of the south. Sutter, the “unwilling craftsmen,” agrees to 
listen to Barrett’s symptoms. In the interview that follows, the two discuss Will’s 
                                                                                                                                                 





past, his childhood, his family, his deja vus, and his theories about bad 
environments and hollow men. Yet when Barrett presses him for an answer, a 
type of directive or imperative to follow, Sutter rebels again. He rails, “Who do 
you think I am, for Christ’s sake? I am no guru and I want no disciples18” (225). 
Still convinced that Sutter knows something that he must know as well, 
something about the root cause of his dislocation and his illness, Will refuses to 
leave, asking instead what it is that Sutter “cleaves to,” pouring himself a glass of 
the “horrendous bourbon” (225).  
 
 
                                                 
18 In an interview with Zoltan Abady-Nagy in 1973 Percy attributes this quote to 
a discussion of Socrates by Kierkegaard. Percy uses it to explain the way The 
Moviegoer’s ending ultimately refuses to be “edifying,” that is, provide a clear 
explanation of Binx’s resolution of his existential crisis and thereby give directive 
to readers. See Conversations with Walker Percy p. 83. Martin Luschei notes in his 
reading of this scene in The Sovereign Wayfarer that “Barret requests only 
formulae of living from Sutter for he is reluctant to assume the sovereignty of his 
own life. His real father and his surrogate father (Sutter) do not provide him the 
clues and signs for living in the world” (p. 143). Luschei’s reading more or less 
hits the nail on the head, but in subsequent paragraphs he elides the similarity 
between Sutter and Val’s melancholic musings and suggests that Will more or 
less moves on from Sutter at this point in the novel, and devotes himself to 
helping Val achieve her goal of baptizing Jamie. The limits of Luschei’s reading 
are explained in part by the fact that he was writing before the publication of The 
Second Coming. Having only one half of Will’s story to work with led him to draw 




IV. Polarizing Crystal, not Magic Eight Ball 
After months of living in the Vaught house, and Will’s dogged pursuit of 
Sutter’s knowledge, the doctor finally gives him a prescription in the form of two 
instructions. The first is that if he encounters a new experience he “will be free to 
act” (271). The second is that if he ever finds himself in “too tight a spot…a 
situation where it is difficult to live from one minute to the next, come and see 
me and I’ll help you” (271). Shortly thereafter, the doctor absconds to New 
Mexico with Jamie, who is now quickly succumbing to his rare blood disorder. 
Abandoned by Sutter and tasked with finding the two of them and sending word 
to the family, Will takes off across the country, suffering from one of his most 
severe cases of amnesia yet, but able, because of Sutter’s directive, to navigate the 
situations which arise along the way. He visits Jamie’s sister Val and sorts out 
what she would have him do when he finds Jamie and Sutter. He helps a band of 
rabble rousing actors and civil rights activists escape from his old hometown by 
standing up to the sheriff. He even manages to endure a night with his uncle 
before comforting Jamie in the final days of his life by sharing a room with him 
and contracting the local priest to perform Jamie’s baptism and last rites. He is 
able to achieve these things, all of which require his action in the immanent 
world, because of Sutter’s directives, and also because of a casebook Sutter leaves 
behind which contains his philosophical ramblings. 
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 Sutter’s casebook is Will’s only link to the doctor for much of the final 
portion of the text. As he drives across country, Will spends his nights reading 
over Sutter’s entries, pouring over the arguments Sutter plans to attempt on Val 
to disabuse her of her faith. The book also includes Sutter’s notes on various 
autopsies, his research into the presence of semen in the urethra’s of suicide 
victims, and his observations about the relationship between sexuality, 
cheerfulness, lewdness, and Christianity in the American south. The writings 
switch back and forth between topics in a manic, erratic manner, but they never 
slide into incoherence. They are the writings of a thoroughly depressed madman, 
unable to affect his own reentry into the immanent sphere, but they are 
shockingly prescient. In one passage, he writes of Will specifically, explaining 
that the engineer’s epistemology, founded on his determination to achieve 
omniscience is faulty. Sutter writes 
He wishes to cling to his transcendence and to locate a fellow transcender 
(e.g., me) who will tell him how to traffic with immanence (e.g., 
“environment,” “groups,” “experience,” etc.) in such a way that he will be 
happy. Therefore I will tell him nothing. For even if I were “right,” his 
posture is self defeating. (353) 
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The doctor rightly diagnoses Will’s problem, he is determined to “know without 
being known.” Will wants to escape the limitations of immanence by way of a 
modern epistemology that seeks to study, order, categorize, and make discrete 
(an affliction Sutter all but accepts as the human condition and supplements 
through his preferred method of reentry, sex). Just as Sutter predicts, Will takes 
the information, throws it into his “immanent meat-grinder” of a psyche, and 
proceeds to nit-pick the problems in Sutter’s argument, once again accepting the 
diagnosis of what has been lost and what is wrong, but unwilling to agree with 
the answers Sutter offers. 
 It is, in part, for this reason that the novel’s conclusion is so frustratingly 
inconclusive. By novel’s end, Will has not modeled reentry from the realm of 
transcendence and he still exists in a state of alienation and melancholia. He has, 
however, progressed in the sense that he has forged a bond with Sutter that 
enables him at least a modicum of intersubjectivity, which he is unwilling to give 
up. In the final scene, Will chases after Sutter’s Edsel as it “took off, spavined and 
sprung, sunk at one corner” (409). Sutter acknowledges his shouting and stops 
the Edsel. As “Strength flowed like oil into his muscles and he ran with great 
joyous ten-foot antelope bounds” (409), Sutter pauses, if only for a moment. The 
novel closes on Sutter allowing Will to approach the car before leaving for his 
ranch where he plans to kill himself. Will’s level of complicity in the plan is 
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unknown. Will’s desire to kill himself is unlikely, given the fact that his 
melancholic temperament is, for him, a prompt for further investigation of his 
strange existence in the world. That said, it’s not out of the realm of possibility, 
especially after the priest’s perfunctory baptism of Jamie using hospital tap water 
disconcerts him and seems to eliminate the possibility of returning to faith. The 
two men cannot agree on what role Sutter should play in Will’s life, they could 
not agree on how to deal with the priest, but in the final scene they leave 
together, bound to one another by nothing except their shared sense that they are 
unable to interact with the world in the way they are expected to engage. 
 The Last Gentleman’s refusal to resolve, to allow Will Barrett back into the 
world, is unsurprising when juxtaposed against Percy’s conception of art as a 
polarizing crystal which he develops in “The Man on the Train.” The novel 
“makes a quantitative division among existential traits…it transmits some more 
or less intact, reverses some, and selectively polarizes others” in doing so, it 
participates in the practice of naming the despair without interpolating the 
reader. By “re-presenting” the readers experience of despair, Percy establishes a 
foundation for intersubjectivity while refusing to be, as he calls it, “edifying.” 
Barrett at novel’s end is directionless, considering following Sutter to the ranch 
but wondering whether he can return east to the Vaught family. If the novel 
ultimately refuses to resolve this quandary, it is because to do so would 
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undermine the novelist’s commitment to a particular epistemology, one rooted in 
a sense of dislocation and characterized by an awareness of the strangeness of 
the self’s existence in the immanent world. This epistemology, which Percy 
elsewhere likens to the life of a pilgrim or “sovereign wayfarer,” is foundational 
for reading the novel and for comprehending Percy’s efforts to map out a way 
for readers trapped by transcendent epistemologies to reenter the world.
61 
 
Chapter 3: New Modes of Attunement: Dread and Radical Astonishment in The 
Second Coming 
Why is it that one can look at a lion or a planet or an owl or at someone’s finger as long 
as one pleases, but looking into the eyes of another person is, if prolonged past a second, a 
perilous affair? 
-Walker Percy Lost in the Cosmos: The Last Self Help Book 
Over forty five years since its original publication, the ending of The Last 
Gentleman has been the subject of frequent debate. Early readings of the novel 
were complicated by the publication of The Second Coming, Percy’s second and 
final Will Barrett novel. In that novel, which chronicles the latter portion of Will 
Barrett’s life, Sutter appears once again, discounting the possibility of suicide. He 
is living in the desert, still in contact with Will and the Vaught family. Yet what is 
perhaps most interesting in relation to the goals of this paper, is that several 
decades later in life, Will is found in possession of his uncanny radar, tuned into 
the strangeness of his existence in the misty mountaintops of the Smokey 
Mountains; a seemingly ideal spot for a man who likes to live as an observer 
suspended above the immanent world. In this novel, Will returns to the question 
of his existence and his inability to enter into the world around him, this time 
without Sutter’s help. 
62 
 
As discussed in the previous chapter, Flatley appropriates Heidegger’s 
terminology and framework to explain a radical reorientation of Dasein’s 
relationship to Being and Vorhanden. But Flatley tracks the ways in which this 
orientation serves as a precursor for political action, specifically the way several 
early modernists dramatize the lives and relationships of communities formed 
around a shared sense of melancholia and direct their energies into collective 
action against the root causes of their dislocation and loss. For Heidegger, and, I 
suggest, for Percy, the implications of conceiving of the self as a being-in-the-
world in various potential authentic or inauthentic modes of attunement is less a 
matter of political action and more a matter of ontology and self-knowledge. 
That is not to say that communal bonds and collective action are unimportant. It 
is to explain, in part, the reasons for Percy’s protagonists’ apparent reversion to 
old ways and old practices in his epilogues and especially in part two of The 
Second Coming. Acknowledging the lack of political engagement in the text is a 
way of pivoting attention towards the real work that communities and 
intersubjectivity do in the text, specifically the methods which they develop for 
triangulating the self, rooting out the causes of the malaise, and keeping it at bay 
over time.  
In an interview conducted by Linda Whitney Hobson just a year after the 
publication of The Second Coming, Percy discussed the book’s engagement with 
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both his conception of consciousness and authentic and inauthentic modes of 
being. For Percy, setting Will down in North Carolina, in an age when “For the 
first time since the Civil War, the South is getting rich” and experiencing a 
“tremendous re-Christianization” through “high-powered evangelical 
Christianity” (218) enables him to dramatize this pursuit of the roots of a species 
of melancholia and malaise in a way that foregrounds the disparity between 
authentic and inauthentic modes of existence. Percy explains to Hobson that Will  
has experienced a loss of sovereignty which has occurred in the lives of 
most of us as well, even though we appear to be freer, to have more, to be 
more individualistic, to have access to more than any people on earth. 
Despite this, a loss of sovereignty has occurred so that we are more subject 
to invisible authority—scientists and so forth. (218) 
The modernization, industrialization, and Christianization of the new south 
conspire to obscure the self’s right relationship to the world, one informed by 
Dasein’s knowledge of the necessity of its death and its placement within the 
world. Any semblance of ordeal has been removed from Will Barrett’s life. His 
attachments to the particular characteristics of place have been diffused to such 
an extent as to render them meaningless, and so he is disconnected, free-floating. 
Yet when the thought of suicide occurs to him, when he remembers his 
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sovereignty, he is thrust back into an alternative Stimmung. The attitude of a 
satiated organism living in a world is replaced by the curiosity of a self, dreading 
the prospect of its continued existence in a state of death-in-life and unable to 
reckon with the possibility of his death. 
 Will’s dread is the key to the puzzle. Situated as he is among wealthy 
retirees in the mountains of North Carolina, Will’s dread seems an especially 
inappropriate way of tuning in to his environment. In Percy’s essay “The 
Coming Crisis in Psychiatry,” he discusses Erich Fromm’s The Sane Society and 
asks why, when an older variant of psycho-analysis was “conquering in the 
provinces” it was being “called into question at its source and center” (251). In 
the essay he challenges the paradigmatic theory of man as organism “with 
instinctive drives and needs not utterly or qualitatively different from those of 
other organisms” (251).  Will’s predicament is a dramatization, an outgrowth of 
this questioning engagement with the social sciences’ attempts to apply “the 
biological method to man” (252). Will’s homelessness, his detachment from his 
community, his obsession with death, these are symptoms of “the sickness of 
modern man” observed by existentialists from Kierkegaard to Marcel but 
insufficiently explained by psychiatry’s anthropology. They are the trademarks 
of a mind which has abdicated its sovereignty and hangs, suspended, above the 
world, unable to engage authentically with the immanent sphere. In The Second 
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Coming, Will reawakens, first to dread, then to ordeal, and finally to a new 
Stimmung. This reawakening presents a radically different theory of man to 
readers, one characterized by a posture of radical astonishment at the existence 
of Being.  
I. Remembering Dread 
The Second Coming opens on a golf course. A much older Will Barrett, 
successful Wall Street lawyer and Rotary Man-of-the-Year, discovers that 
something is very wrong. In the opening paragraphs, the narrator informs us 
For some time he had been feeling depressed without knowing why. In 
fact, he didn’t even realize he was depressed. Rather was it the world and 
life around him which seemed to grow more senseless and farcical with 
each passing day. (3) 
This species of malaise is familiar. It is the same deep despair which Binx Bolling, 
Thomas Moore, Lancelot Lamar, and a young Will Barrett fell victim to. Yet for 
the older Will Barrett, it appears as something new to be marveled at, studied 
and understood. Though, as the book goes on, other characters suggest that Will 
has never been truly healthy; prone to “fade-outs” and impulsive decisions to 
disappear. Will comes to in a bunker on the country club course he knows like 
his own backyard, and as if no time has passed since the death of Jamie Vaught, 
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he becomes aware of his own strangeness and of the strangeness of the 
“senseless and farcical” world in which he lives. 
 Yet Will is closer this time to a discovery that will help unmask the root 
cause of his despair. As he steps into the woods to retrieve a sliced ball,  
He heard something and the sound reminded him of an event that had 
happened a long time ago. It was the most important event in his life, yet 
he had managed until that moment to forget it. (3) 
The memory which he had buried for so long, and which he later recognizes as 
“the most important event in his life” is of his father’s first attempted suicide. 
The older Barrett first attempted to shoot his son and himself at the foot of a tree 
on a Georgia hunting excursion and then misrepresented the event as an accident 
in the wake of his and Will’s survival. Yet this does not occur to him in the 
moment he steps off the fairway to retrieve his ball. Rather, his immediate 
response is to become “even more depressed” because, for the first time “it 
occurred to him that he might shoot himself” (3-4). The thought, which initially 
“popped into his head” and which he later “entertained ironically” becomes an 
obsessive preoccupation throughout the course of the novel.  
The Second Coming, unlike its precursor which ends in a baffling bit of 
ambiguity, is Percy’s attempt to see one of his protagonists experience an 
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alternative Stimmung. The epilogues of The Moviegoer and Love in the Ruins 
contain similar efforts, but in both cases the epilogue comes long after the plot 
arc of the novel draws to a close. The Second Coming is Percy’s clearest attempt to 
dramatize a comedic alternative outcome to the existential crisis. Juxtaposed 
against the absurd, the outcome of the successfully navigated existential crisis in 
Camus and Sartre, this comedic alternative barely seems to differ from the mode 
of life which Heidegger identified as a death-in-life. Dasein may appear to most 
outside observers to have sunk back into an uncritical engagement with the 
world of its care. This misconception is explainable in part through a 
reconsideration of the nature of Stimmung particularly the word’s relationship to 
the concept of tuning or attunement. The dread Will rediscovers brings him 
closer to a direct encounter with, or a transcending to, nothingness. This dread is 
not the result of his surroundings. He reawakens to dread in the quiet, sun filled 
air of his North Carolina country club. Rather his mode of attunement to these 
surroundings precludes the possibility of living authentically, that is, with the 
knowledge of the necessity of his death coupled with radical astonishment at his 
continued life. The comedic climax of the novel comes after Will descends to the 
edge of death in a search for the point of origin of his despair. The nature of this 
comedic conclusion—and it is comedic in the old sense in that it involves a 
wedding—can be best understood in light of Percy’s repeated attempts to liken 
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the protagonist to a broken or overly sensitive radio. It is his attunement which 
changes as a result of a new, ontologically rooted understanding of the self 
which is provided to him through the establishment of intersubjectivity.  
II. Following Dread to Despair 
The narrator of The Second Coming, like the narrator of The Last Gentleman 
peppers the text with asides, jokes, and observations at the expense of the 
protagonist. Immediately following Will’s realization that he is free to kill 
himself, the narrator launches into a direct address, asking the reader “What is 
one to make of such a person?...though it was probably the case that he was Ill 
and that it was his illness—depression—which made the world seem farcical, it 
is impossible to prove the case” (4). In the passage that follows, the narrator calls 
the definition of depression into question. If depression is defined as a particular 
departure from a statistical norm, then any argument which seeks to discredit or 
denigrate Will’s consideration of suicide as (sick/demented/perverse/an 
inadequate response of an organism whose needs have been sated) is “abstract 
and useless” (5). The narrator points out that with depression on the rise, it is 
feasible to consider a world in which “the proportion of undepressed to 
depressed people changes from ninety-nine to one to fifty-fifty” (5). In such a 
world, Will’s melancholizing would not be deemed aberrant behavior, but 
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merely an alternative mode of thought, a mechanism for pursuing a different 
type of knowledge. It is this approach to knowledge which Percy dramatizes 
through Will’s decision to wager his life in order to force God to appear. 
 Will makes the decision to push deeper into the despair. He is obsessed 
with his father’s suicide and manifesting signs of a peculiar mental disorder. The 
prospect of suicide is now a legitimate option, a bargaining chip. As he sits in his 
Mercedes, admiring the “weight and ugliness and beauty” of his Luger, he 
smiles, and shakes his head fondly. His father’s attempted murder-suicide 
appears to him in a new light. Alone in the car, he imagines himself speaking to 
his father, saying 
Right, you said I will not put up with a life which is not life or death. I 
don’t have to and I won’t. Right, old mole, and if you were here in rich 
reborn Christian Carolina with its condos and 450 SELs and old folks 
rolling pills and cackling at Hee Haw, you wouldn’t put up with that 
either. (131-132) 
The emergence of the new south triggered a physiological reaction in the 
younger Will of The Last Gentleman. The bulldozers and jackhammers that built 
the highways and cul-de-sacs of the modern suburban landscape intensified his 
detachment and his fugue states. Now, years later, he recognizes that his despair 
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is still connected to his attunement to the modern world, but once again he 
forges a communal bond which promises to help reorient him. His problem is 
hereditary, and his father’s attempt to take his life offers insight to Will about the 
tak he should take.  
 For the older Barrett, anger and suicide offered an alternative to the death-
in-life of the modern world. Still clutching the Luger and sitting inside his 
Mercedes, Will hits on the key to his father’s suicide. Will realizes that his father, 
a committed humanist with a stoic temperament who helped to liberate 
Buchenwald, was “possessed by anger, anger which in the end [he] turned on 
[himself]” (133). Will’s father faced the greatest horrors the twentieth century 
had to offer, and returned home to a society that was quickly forsaking the old 
order and old ways which had structured his family’s life for generations. His 
response was rejection. Still speaking to his father, Will continues to probe his 
motives. In the quiet of the car he says “You loved only death because for you 
what passed for life was really a death-in-life, which has no name and so is 
worse than death” (133). Like Will, the older Barrett is distraught by the 
absurdity of continuing to live in the modern world as if life is as it always was. 
Yet for the older Barrett, the only recourse was suicide. In a world that was 
quickly choosing to depart from his stoic, humanist code of honor, he chose an 
outright rejection of the world. He shot at Will as a warning and attempted to 
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shoot himself. Yet Will feels compelled to ask about an alternative, a different 
way of relating to the modern world. The “old mole…didn’t even bother to ask,” 
but Will, “if only from Episcopal rectitude and an Episcopal sense of form” 
decides that he must, at the very least, consider the possibility that his father’s 
suicide was, if justifiable, utterly wasted.   
 Will’s father’s developed an erotic attachment to death, a longing for 
annihilation and nothing as an alternative to the necessity of enduring death-in-
life while inevitably hurtling toward one’s death. Though he failed to complete 
the act initially, years later he succeeded, this time in the attic while Will was at 
home. Still imagining himself speaking to his father, Will rants 
And what samurai self-love of death, let alone the little death of everyday 
fuck-you love, can match the double Winchester come of taking oneself 
into oneself, the cold-steel extension of oneself into mouth, yes, for you, 
for me, for us, the logical and ultimate act of fuck-you love fuck-off world, 
the penetration and union of perfect cold gunmetal into warm quailing 
mortal flesh, the coming to end all coming, brain cells which together 
faltered and fell short, now flowered and flew apart, flung like stars 
around the whole dark world. (148-149) 
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In his father’s later, successful suicide, Will sees the “logical and ultimate act” of 
rejection, the endpoint of dread and a reasonable response to the prospect of 
nothingness. He even identifies himself with his father. His father, like Sutter, is 
attuned to the prospect of nothingness as he is and so the suicide appears as a 
road map, an act of defiance completed by a fellow member of the community of 
melancholiacs. The “brain cells which together faltered and fell short,” construed 
suicide as the ultimate little death, the only alternative to death-in-life. As a 
consequence they “flowered and flew apart, flung like stars around the whole 
dark world.” Will refuses to valorize his father’s suicide. His own grief at the loss 
of his father is coupled with his philosophical rejection of his father’s decision. 
The self-fellating imagery dramatizes the inward turning, rejection of the world 
that precedes suicide. Instead of union with another, intersubjectivity, his father 
chooses the solipsists way out. Will, on the other hand, experiences an intense 
curiosity at the peculiarity of his existence. His melancholia is not an erotic 
attachment to annihilation. It is, instead, the first step in his reorientation 
towards the outside world. 
 Will chooses another path. He writes to Sutter, explaining that he intends 
to improve on Pascal’s wager and force God to show his cards. He ventures 
down into Lost Cove Cave with a pocket full of sleeping pills and the intention to 
demand a sign from God or die. He even offers Sutter the chance to write up the 
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results of the experiment in a medical journal. The narrator makes it perfectly 
clear that Will has succumbed to a form of insanity, yet Will is arriving at exactly 
that point which Heidegger, and Percy, envisioned as a bottoming out. He is 
fully aware that the conditions under which he currently lives are intolerable. 
Like his father, Will exists in a state of death-in-life from which he cannot escape. 
To continue living is an unendurable prospect for him. Will’s dread is a suspicion 
that, at bottom, there is nothing for him to dread, but rather an arbitrary and 
pointless existence deprived of the old myths and the olds means of living an 
honorable and accomplished life. His need to overcome this dread, to flush God 
into the open or come to terms with his absence, leads him into the cave. There, 
under the influence of sedatives and gradually starving himself, he slips in and 
out of hallucinogenic dreams, but receives no sign. Finally, he awakens after 
days of intermittent sleep to a toothache too painful to ignore. The painful 
sensation he experiences in the cave thrusts his body back into his thoughts. 
With little thought he is driven up and out, but in the process he gets lost, takes a 
wrong turn, and finds himself tumbling, seriously injured, through the vent that 






From the moment Wills crashes through the vines covering Allie’s vent, 
the novel takes a comedic turn. Will reemerges from the cave without receiving 
any answer or completing his suicide, but he does not care in his state. Allie, 
whose history as an escaped mental patient is punctuated by periods of 
withdrawal from community, refusing to speak, and becoming disoriented, is 
naturally more attuned to the peculiarities of life and language. When he falls 
through the vent, knocking himself unconscious, he is “a problem to be solved” 
(213), and she is an ideal person to solve it. Because of the amnesia induced by 
her electro-shock therapy, Allie views the world afresh when she arrives in Will’s 
town. Phrases on bumper stickers appear to her as mysteries. She must work to 
name things and identify her surroundings. She has to prioritize finding food 
and housing in a town filled with wealthy retirees and “leafers.” Though the 
amnesia gradually wears off, Allie is reentering life with the intent to retain her 
sovereignty. Rather than remain a pawn in her parents bid to gain control of her 
inheritance or a subject of Dr. Duk’s experiments and inquiries, Allie sets out to 
learn for herself how to live. Because she is incapable of using language initially, 
this new found sovereignty is accompanied by a radical astonishment at the 
existence of things in her immanent sphere and her own capacity to name them, 
or receive the name for them. Her consciousness gradually expands with her 
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linguistic capacity, but she retains her sovereignty and her astonishment. Her 
mode of being-in-the-world is authentic, if, at first, primitive, and as it develops, 
she is gradually able to bring Will into tune with her and with his surroundings. 
When will awakens he is still seriously injured, sick, and in need of 
professional help. Almost immediately, however, he finds himself able to 
connect with her in a way that he never has before. This starts simply, with the 
two of them sharing the daily responsibilities of the greenhouse, Allie tending 
the fire, Will confined to his bed but intently watching her. Quickly they begin to 
rely on one another. As Will tells her, 
I accept what you’ve done for me and…I have other things to ask of you. I 
don’t mind asking you. There are things that need to be done and only 
you can do them. (244) 
Will did not find his answer in the cave, but he tells Allie “At least I know what I 
have to do” (246) and he relies on her to help him do it. Will has forged a new 
bond with her. He can share in everyday tasks without slipping into abstraction. 
He doesn’t ponder killing himself for some time. He can focus on healing and 
helping Allie maintain the home they share. When he tries to support himself 
and leave the greenhouse,  however, he collapses and Allie must again play the 
nurse. She hauls him back inside, strips him naked and removes her own clothes, 
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and warms him with her body heat. As he awakens to her, lying naked next to 
him, he is nearly overwhelmed by her immediacy and their intimacy. Though 
they don’t make love, they experience a connection that Allie thinks of as “a way 
of making love” (262). 
In that moment of intense intimacy and immediacy, Will is not assaulted 
by his fugue states or his allergies or any other physical ailment. Instead he 
receives a rare moment of intersubjectivity and speaks to Allie  
using words like ’shameful secret of success as a lawyer,’ ‘phony,’ ‘radar,’ 
‘our new language,’ ‘this gift of yours and mine,’ ‘ours’ (this was her 
favorite), ‘being above things,’ ‘not being able to get back down to things’ 
(!), ‘how to reenter the world’ (?), ‘by God?’ ‘by her?’ (!!!!!), ‘your 
forgetting and my remembering,’ ‘Sutter,’ ‘Sutter was right,’ ‘Sutter was 
wrong,’ ‘Sutter Vaught.’ (262) 
In this moment he can explain to her his theories about his radar and the noxious 
particles, his struggles to reenter the immanent world, and his preoccupation 
with Sutter’s philosophical outlook, but Percy’s summary rendering of this 
conversation, coupled by the utterly domestic conversations and events which 
bookend it in the text, make it an almost perfunctory step. These theories pale in 
comparison to his astonishment at Allie’s care for him, the details of the 
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greenhouse, and his engagement with the world around him. Will’s melancholy 
is replaced with a sense of wonder. What is astounding is his ability to use words 
like “ours” and “yours and mine.” He is tuned into his surroundings in a 
fundamentally different way, no longer attempting to study the world and 
engineer his life, Will is living out a new mode of Being-with-the-world. 
As the novel draws to a close, Will continues to experience some 
symptoms akin to his earlier days. His condition is diagnosed as a rare pH 
imbalance and he is forced, momentarily, to take up residence in an elderly care 
home. He has a serious medical condition which, despite some suggestions that 
it may go away, continues to plague his life. Yet what truly enables him  to 
reenter the world is not the medicine that  balances his pH. Rather what heals 
him is his love for Allie, his connections with the elderly residents of the 
retirement home, and his desire to start his life anew. For the first time in his life 
he is radically astonished at the things, vorhanden, in his immediate sphere. The 
world appears mysterious to him. His concerns about the strange correlation 
between twentieth century man’s triumph over his environment and his descent 
into barbarism and violence remain but they are subjugated to the more central 
question of why he and Allie and the whole cast of minor characters that 
surround them exist at all. 
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 Will’s fascination with the existence of things, juxtaposed against his 
melancholic preoccupation with nothing, is an alternative way of tuning into the 
world. This new Stimmung enables him to engage with the immanent. Rather 
than sitting in caves looking for signs of God’s existence, or pondering the 
“singularity of things,” Will revels in his capacity to connect with Allie. He 
marvels at her body’s quirks, her neo-logisms, her wonder at the world. His 
search is not over. In his final conversation with Father Weatherbee in the attic of 
the retirement home, he reiterates his questions about why there is so much 
melancholia, so much death-in-life, among the people of the wealthiest 
civilizations on the face of the earth (359). The threat of annihilation and the 
possibility that the center cannot hold is still very much in the front of Will’s 
mind. Yet this fear differs from dread because, unlike his father, he has decided 
to seek new answers in the peculiarity of his unique predicament. He asks, his 
heart leaping with “a secret joy” if it is possible that the answer he received in the 
cave was not ambiguous or merely absent, but rather that his love for Allie, and 
the entirely different mode of living it ushered in, was that answer. He asks “Is 
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